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Remainer	or	Leaver?	The	emergence	of	the	Brexit
identity	prism
Britons	used	to	identify	as	supporters	of	a	political	party.	Now	they	are	more	likely	to	identify
themselves	as	a	‘Remainer’	or	a	‘Leaver’.	Ian	Montagu	(ScotCen)	looks	at	the	challenges	this
new	political	divide	presents	as	Britain	prepares	to	leave	the	EU.
The	past	half-century	has	seen	a	more	or	less	continuous	decline	in	the	number	of	voters	who	say
that	they	identify	with	a	political	party.	While	this	development	has	meant	that	the	choices	made	by
many	voters	may	now	be	more	likely	to	reflect	their	policy	preferences,	it	has	also	been	seen	as
resulting	in	an	electorate	that	is	more	difficult	to	motivate	to	turn	out	and	vote	in	the	first	place.
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In	the	wake	of	Brexit,	however,	it	appears	that	new	political	identities	may	have	emerged.	Sara	Hobolt	has	argued
that	voters	have	developed	a	sense	of	emotional	attachment	with	being	a	‘Remainer’	or	a	‘Leaver’,	and	that	these
identities	have	in	turn	become	a	prism	through	which	the	Brexit	debate	is	interpreted.
New	research	undertaken	using	NatCen’s	mixed-mode	random	probability	panel	supports	this	claim.	Brexit	identities
are	now	much	more	prevalent	than	traditional	party	identities	–	while	31%	of	people	don’t	think	of	themselves	as	a
supporter	of	a	political	party,	only	11%	don’t	think	of	themselves	as	a	‘Remainer’	or	a	‘Leaver’.	Even	more	tellingly,
44%	say	that	they	are	a	‘very	strong’	Remainer	or	Leaver,	while	only	9%	say	they	identify	‘very	strongly’	with	a
political	party.
This	development	might	go	some	way	to	explaining	why,	as	the	WhatUKThinks	Poll	of	Polls	illustrates,	support	for
both	Remain	and	Leave	has	been	so	stable	during	the	Brexit	negotiations.	Those	with	strong	Brexit	identities	are
particularly	unlikely	to	change	their	minds	about	the	merits	of	their	decision	in	2016	–	99%	of	‘very	strong’	and	94%	of
‘fairly	strong’	Remainers	report	that	they	would	vote	the	same	way	again,	as	do	98%	of	‘very	strong’	and	94%	of
‘fairly	strong’	Leavers.
Those	with	a	strong	Brexit	identity	often	have	distinctive	views	about	some	of	the	key	issues	in	the	debate	about
Britain’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU.	For	example,	while	requiring	migrants	from	the	EU	to	apply	to	come	to
Britain	in	the	same	way	as	those	from	outside	the	EU	is	relatively	popular	among	Remainers	as	well	as	Leavers,	a
far	lower	proportion	of	those	who	identify	‘very	strongly’	with	Remain	are	in	favour	of	this	idea.
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This	pattern	is	echoed	in	voters’	attitudes	to	whether	or	not	Britain	should	allow	freedom	of	movement	for	EU	citizens
in	return	for	the	continuation	of	free	trade	with	the	EU.	While	most	Remainers	are	divided	between	those	who	think
that	Britain	‘probably	should’	be	willing	to	strike	such	a	deal	and	those	who	believe	that	it	‘probably	should	not’,	a
relatively	high	proportion	of	‘very	strong’	Remainers	(62%)	believe	that	Britain	‘definitely	should’	allow	free	movement
in	return	for	free	trade.	Similarly,	while	18%	of	‘not	very	strong’	Leavers	believe	that	Britain	‘definitely	should	not’
allow	free	movement	in	return	for	free	trade,	at	41%	the	proportion	of	‘very	strong’	Leavers	who	feel	that	Britain
‘definitely	should	not’	strike	such	a	deal	is	more	than	twice	this	size.
Those	with	a	strong	Brexit	identity	also	make	a	different	assessment	of	how	likely	or	unlikely	it	is	that	Britain	will
emerge	with	a	good	deal	from	the	EU	–	those	who	identify	‘very	strongly’	with	Remain	are	most	likely	to	think	that
Britain	will	emerge	with	a	bad	deal,	while	‘very	strong’	Leavers	are	most	likely	to	believe	that	Britain	will	negotiate	a
good	deal.
Finally,	the	strength	of	voters’	Brexit	identity	is	reflected	in	who	they	believe	is	to	blame	for	the	prospect	of	a	bad
deal,	with	‘very	strong’	Remainers	particularly	likely	to	feel	that	the	UK	government	has	been	handling	the	talks	badly
and	‘very	strong’	Leavers	especially	critical	of	the	EU.	Both	groups	are	seemingly	attributing	blame	in	a	way	that
reinforces	their	existing	views,	with	Leavers	inclined	to	blame	the	EU	because	they	dislike	the	institution	itself	while
Remainers	lay	the	fault	at	the	door	of	the	UK	government	because	they	disagree	with	its	attempt	to	leave	the	EU	in
the	first	place.
The	emergence	of	these	new	identities	over	the	past	two	years	may	have	a	positive	impact	upon	levels	of	turnout	–
those	with	a	strong	Brexit	identity	were	more	likely	to	have	voted	in	both	the	EU	referendum	(86%)	and	in	the
subsequent	2017	General	Election	(87%)	than	those	with	no	sense	of	Brexit	identity	(50%	and	51%	respectively).
However,	the	prevalence	and	strength	of	Remain	and	Leave	as	new	political	identities	illustrates	just	how	deep	the
Brexit	chasm	now	runs	–	and	how	much	of	a	challenge	it	may	prove	to	bridge	it.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Ian	Montagu	is	a	Senior	Researcher	at	the	Scottish	Centre	for	Social	Research	(ScotCen).
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